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Abstract
Security experts confront new attacks on TLS/SSL every year. Ever since the compres-
sion side-channel attacks CRIME and BREACH were presented during security conferences
in 2012 and 2013, online users connecting to HTTP servers that run TLS version 1.2 are
susceptible of being impersonated. We set up three Randomized Lempel-Ziv Models, which
are built on Lempel-Ziv77, to confront this attack. Our three models change the determin-
istic characteristic of the compression algorithm: each compression with the same input
gives output of different lengths. We implemented SSL/TLS protocol and the Lempel-
Ziv77 compression algorithm, and used them as a base for our simulations of compression
side-channel attack. After performing the simulations, all three models successfully pre-
vented the attack. However, we demonstrate that our randomized models can still be
broken by a stronger version of compression side-channel attack that we created. But this
latter attack has a greater time complexity and is easily detectable. Finally, from the
results, we conclude that our models couldn’t compress as well as Lempel-Ziv77, but they
can be used against compression side-channel attacks.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The internet is growing bigger and bigger everyday. Along with Facebook’s new drone
project, even more people will have access to the internet [28]. More information will
travel on the network, and we want information to travel in a fast and secure way. Data
compression is used to make the information travel faster, and data encryption is used to
make sure the information is confidential.
Internet communications use a protocol called TLS, Transport Layer Security, to com-
press and secure connections between server and client. TLS provides authentication with
certificates, confidentiality with encryption, and integrity with message digest. For com-
pression, TLS also supports DEFLATE [20] and LZS [16].
Currently, servers are using TLS version 1.2, which supports compression. However,
combining compression with encrpytion is not secure. Adversaries can use the length of the
compression output to retrieve content of the encrypted message. This type of attack is
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called side-channel attack, where the attacker does not directly attack the encryption key.
A side-channel attack that uses compression length is called Compression Side-Channel
Attack (CSCA).
The compression side-channel attack was studied in a paper at the beginning of year
2002 [21]. In the paper, the authors explain how an adversary uses the output length
of compressed encrypted text to decipher a secret within the message. In recent years,
two compression side-channel attacks, CRIME (Compression Redundancy Infoleak Made
Easy) in 2012 [13] and BREACH (Browser Reconnaissance and Exfiltration via Adaptive
Compression of Hypertext) in 2013 [17] were demonstrated during computer security con-
ferences. The two presenters, Juliano Rizzo and Thai Duong, successfully decrypted a
secret HTTP message. TLS took a big hit and plans to shutdown all compression methods
completely in its next version 1.3 [25].
1.1 TLS History
When the internet was first designed, only trusted nodes could connect to it and talk to
each other. These nodes were connected to each other by wires, and spying was impossible.
Nowadays, internet has gone wiress and any spy can listen to the conversation. Security
was needed for the message’s confidentiality and integrity.
Netscape designed in 1994 a protocol, SSL 1.0, to add security over the network. HTTP
runs on top of this protocol, and it is called HTTPS [24]. The first two versions, SSL 1.0
and SSL 2.0, were implemented but never released due to security flaws. Only the third
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version, SSL 3.0, got released in 1995 [15]. Four years later, in 1999, TLS 1.0 was published
[9]. It is an upgraded protocol to replace SSL 3.0. Around 2011, Thai Duong and Juliano
Rizzo presented BEAST (Browser Exploit Against SSL/TLS) that an adversary can use
to retrieve an authentication token. It exploit a vulnerability in Cipher Block Chaining
mode that TLS 1.0 is using. TLS 1.1 came out in April 2006 to address BEAST attack
[10]. In August 2008, TLS 1.2 was released to implement authenticated encryption [11].
In June 2015, SSL 3.0 is deprecated [3].
Nowadays, most servers are using TLS 1.2. Attacks still appeared, thus forced the
upgrade to TLS 1.3. TLS 1.3 is still in its draft phase. But, it has dropped compression
among other insecure features [25].
1.2 Contribution
Removing compression will have a big impact on the network traffic due to uncompressed
large packets. In this paper, we propose three schemes where compression could be ren-
abled. The schemes modify the inputs and/or outputs of the compression algorithm. They
are listed as followed:
(1) Weak Cipher With Lempel-Ziv
(2) Lempel-Ziv With Control
(3) Lempel-Ziv With Control And Feedback
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We created and simulated the normal compression side-channel attack on our schemes
to analyse the tradeoff between compression ratio and security: the complexity of the
compression side-channel attack increased in exchange of a drop in compression ratio.
Additionally, we also simulated another version of CRIME/BREACH attack, called
Strong Compression Side-Channel Attack (SCSCA). This attack was designed to break
our schemes, but with a higher time complexity.
With the strong compression side-channel attack, our schemes are breached if the ad-
versary was given a large amount of time. The time complexity is high and the attack is
not feasible for an attacker to retrieve the secret given a short amount time.
Schemes are not limited only to repeating inputs or outputs around the compression
algorithm. Another possible scheme is to fragment the message into smaller pieces then
rearrange them before performing compression. This scheme also increases CSCA time
complexity with a decrease in compression ratio as trade-off.
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows.
First, in Chapter 2, we summarize three papers that are related to our work. These
three papers talk about compression side-channel attack, CRIME, and BREACH attacks.
In Chapter 3, we define the notation used in our work, and we also define terminologies
that are substantial.
In Chapter 4, we describe TLS protocol and the Lempel-Ziv compression algorithm on
which we run our simulation.
In Chapter 5, we introduce the compression side-channel attack and explain its mech-
anism. Also, we present our schemes to fight against this attack. Next, we present our
4
results of our models to show that our randomized Lempel-Ziv models can resist the attack.
In Chapter 6, we test the limit of our models: we extended the compression side-channel
attack into a strong compression side-channel attack. After testing, our randomized models
fail to resist the strong compression side-channel attack. However, the attack has a lengthy
running time and is easily preventable.
In Chapter 7, we introduce a different type of Randomized Lempel-Ziv model that could
defer CSCA or even SCSCA. This new model is based on permutation of same-length block
of the plaintext before performing compression.
Lastly, we conclude with our findings in Chapter 8 and suggest ideas for future work.
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Chapter 2
Literature Survey
The latest version of TLS provides online conversation’s privacy by using encryption and
decryption. Only the parties who know the correct key can encrypt and decrypt messages.
The security level is usually based on how hard it is for an attacker to retrieve this key.
But, instead of attacking the key direcly, attackers can use side-channel leakage to get into
the conversation.
One of the earliest papers which addressed side-channel information leakage was pub-
lished in 2002 [21]. Ten years after the publication of that paper, during a hackers confer-
ence in 2012, Juliano Rizzo and Thai Duong presented the CRIME attack that uses side
channel leakage [13]. Then, a year later, the same two authors published another attack,
BREACH, that also exploits HTTPS in a similar manner [17].
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2.1 Compression Side-Channel Attacks
Information leakage from combinaton of compression with encryption was first mentioned
in the paper titled “Compression and Information Leakage of Plaintext”. With this attack,
an attacker can extract the entire message under special conditions. Two required condi-
tions must be met: compression must be done before encryption, and the attacker must
know a small part of the plaintext. Overall, this paper explained and showed examples of
how compression side-channel attack can be executed in many ways using chosen-plaintext
attack. It also lists caveats and countermeasures, such as obscuring the output size. In
2012, the concepts from this paper were used to create actual attacks against HTTPS,
which forced TLS 1.3 to remove compression. The two attacks are described below.
2.2 CRIME
Two researchers Juliano Rizzo and Thai Duong presented CRIME (Compression Ratio
Info-leak Made Easy) at Ekoparty hacker conference in 2012 [13]. This attack uses com-
pression redundancy as side-channel to decrypt cipher-text. The compression algorithm
that is being exploited is called DEFLATE [7], which is used in TLS and SPDY protocols.
DEFLATE is an efficient compression algorithm by combining LZ77 and Huffman coding
[6].
During the conference, the presenters executed their compression side-channel attack on
Yahoo Mail and Twitter, and managed to successfully retrieve secret tokens from encrypted
messages. The secret tokens are authentication tokens, which an adversary could use to
7
impersonate another user.
The attack exploits the fact that DEFLATE compression is used before encryption,
and also, the same token is being used during one session. The token is located as a cookie
within HTTP header.
Normally, this cookie is encrypted and cannot be understood by an attacker, but with
CRIME, the attacker can retrieve this cookie in a short amout of time. The typical way for
an attacker to recover the cookie is to test all combination of the token, which has O(256n)
complexity where 256 is the number of possible characters and n is the length of the string.
With CRIME attack, the attacker can get the string in O(256×n) by progressively guessing
each character.
For this attack to work, the victim must first visit a malicious website and have his
browser infected by CRIME agent. Then this agent will add forged text to the HTTP
header, and make many requests to the web server. When these requests are compressed,
encrypted then sent, the attacker measures the cipher-text length, and can retrieve the
cookie. The conference demo lasted about 30 minutes and the presenters successfully
retrieved the cookie from Twitter.
After discovery of this CRIME attack, TLS compression was disabled for most browsers
and web servers to mitigate CRIME attack. Compression has been disabled on the trans-
port layer, and caused increase of latency in the network because packets are not com-
pressed. Network performance is reduced, but confidentiality is preserved.
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2.3 BREACH
HTTPS was still not safe after CRIME was patched. In 2013, a new attack BREACH
(Browser Reconnaissance and Exfiltration via Adaptive Compression of Hypertext) is men-
tioned during the Black Hat conference [17].
BREACH, presented by Angelo Prado, Neal Harris, and Yoel Gluck, is also a compres-
sion side-channel attack. Unlinke CRIME where the attacker examines the HTTP request
headers, BREACH exploits compressed HTTP responses [23].
The three researchers launched the BREACH attack on a web server and were able to
retrieve the authentication token hidden inside a HTTP header in less than 30 seconds.
They also launched the attack on a Microsoft Outlook mail server and, without logging in,
they were able to change the language and to add a new mailbox rule to their mailbox in
less than 30 seconds as well.
For this attack to work, two conditions must be met. Firstly, HTTP compression
must be enabled. Secondly, the HTTP response body must contain the cookie given by
the matching HTTP request. Servers that have HTTP compression enabled and reflects
the authentication token in its HTTP responses body are vulnerable to this attack. This
compression side-channel attack showed that compression before encryption is vulnerable
in more layers than just TLS protocol.
Different mitigation steps were suggested in this paper [17]. The easiest mitigation
step is to disable HTTP compression for all servers. If HTTP compression is disabled, this
would have a major impact on web application performance. Other mitigation steps were
suggested as well, such as randomizing the length of the response, making secrets more
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dynamic, padding the compressed message, monitoring the traffic, etc. . These methods
are not generic: one method of mitigation would work better for a certain application than
another. Thus, most web servers would be advised simply to remove HTTP compression.
The two compression side-channel attacks, BREACH and CRIME, show that having
compression and encryption is vulnerable. By disabling all compression, network latency is
increased even more. In this thesis, we demonstrate that compression side-channel attack
can be defered by adding randomness to compression algorithm, however, it comes with
an increase in time complexity of the compression, and decrease in compression ratio.
10
Chapter 3
Preliminaries
In this chapter, we describe the Lempel-Ziv compression algorithm family. We also present
the pseudo-random sequence generator, and the encryption algorithms that will be used
in our proposed models.
3.1 Compression Algorithms
We use the following notations throughout of the thesis:
A||B concatenates two binary strings A and B
ζ represents an alphabet or character.
Σ is a set containing all possible alphabets.
M is the plaintext.
C is the ciphertext.
argminxy is a function returning the argument x that associates to the smallest value y.
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3.1.1 Lempel-Ziv 77 and 78
Lempel-Ziv 77 The Lempel-Ziv compression algorithm, shown in Algorithm 1, was
created by Abraham Lempel and Jacob Ziv. They published their first version in 1977,
called Lempel-Ziv77, also known as LZ77. This compression algorithm focus on replacing
repeated patterns with references to locations where they happened before. The reference
is a length-distance tuple, which indicates the location of the pattern and its length. The
reference tuple also contains the next character after the pattern.
Algorithm 1 Lempel-Ziv77(file)
1: current position← start of file
2: outputs list← empty list
3: while current position not reach end of file do
4: move sliding window
5: longest str ← find longest matching string for current pos in sliding window
6: pos← relative starting position of longest str from current pos
7: len← length of longest str
8: next char ← next character after longest str in sliding window
9: append (pos, len, next char) to outputs list
10: current position← current position+ j
11: end while
12: return outputs list
LZ77 Example If we run the LZ77 algorithm on “abcabcd”, we would get “abc(0,3,‘d’)”
since the second “abc” is repeated, and it gets replaced by “(0,3,‘d’)”, where the first
number, 0, is the location, and the second number, 3, is the length. This latter tuple
would get converted to two bytes. Thus, for the text “abcabcd”, LZ77 would give a
compression ratio of 5
7
, since the original text has length of 7 bytes, and LZ77 outputs has
length 5 bytes. When decompressing, two numbers, 0 and 3, inside the tuple will be used.
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The second number, 3, is the length of the repeated pattern. The tuple “(0,3,‘d’)” gets
replaced by “abcd”.
LZ78 In the year that followed, 1978, the same two authors published their second com-
pression algorithm named Lempel-Ziv78, LZ78, which is an extension of LZ77 [31]. In this
version, the length of the repeated pattern is removed in the reference tuple. The repeated
pattern gets replaced only by “(location, next character)” pair. The length is omitted since
it can be calculated from start location and position of the next character.
Huffman Coding Huffman Coding is another compression algorithm which is often used
with LZ77. This compression algorithm gives an encoding to each character. The most
frequently used characters get an encoding of a smaller length, and the least frequently
used characters get an encoding of a larger length.
DEFLATE and gzip Both DEFLATE and gzip are popular compression algorithms
used by HTTP. When the compression is done using DEFLATE algorithm, the plain-
text is first compressed by LZ77, then compressed again by Huffman encoding. The gzip
compression algorithm is the same as DEFLATE, but it adds a CRC-32 checksum to the
message after compression.
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3.2 Pseudo-Random Sequence Generator
De Bruijn Sequences The sequence is named after the mathematician Nicolaas Govert
de Bruijn. Given an order n, the sequence outputs a cyclic sequence of bits where every
substring of length n is unique [18].
WG-8 Cipher The WG-8 cipher, designed by Professor Gong with Xinxin Fan and
Kalikinkar Mandal, is a light-weight cipher that outputs a sequence with 2-level auto-
correlation. The keystream sequences outputs have many randomness properties, such as
a period of 2160− 1, balanced 0’s and 1’s, two level auto correlation sequence, ideal t-tuple
distribution, and large linear span of 233.32 [14].
Mersenne Twister Mersenne Twister generator was created in year 1997 by Makoto
Matsumoto and Takuji Nishimura [22]. This pseudo-random number generator is based on
a Mersenne Prime number, which is a prime number that can be written in this format:
2n−1 where n is also a prime. The period of Mersenne Twister is equal to the prime number.
It is a quick pseudo-random number generator and has better randomness properties than
other fast generators. Generally, Mersenne Twister picks 219937 − 1 as its prime. It has
good randomness properties such as period of 219937 − 1, and it passes Diehard tests.
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3.3 Encryption Algorithm
AES Cipher AES does block encryption. In HTTP or TLS protocol, compression is
used before applying AES encryption. It takes a key of either 128, 196, 256 bits, and an
input block of the same length, then outputs encrypted block of that length [26].
15
Chapter 4
Implementation of Components
In this chapter, we explain in detail the ways we implemented TLS/SSL protocol on which
we simulated the side-channel. We also implemented Lempel-Ziv77 compression following
its algorithm since we are using it to compress messages and Python 2.7 does not provide
the library. Additionally, we implemented a hardware version of Lempel-Ziv77 compression
algorithm which uses hash tables for quicker reference lookups.
4.1 TLS/SSL Implementation
We implemented in C++ our own TLS/SSL protocol as a target for our compression
side-channel attack simulations. This protocol is built on top of the native TCP socket
package. So, we first implemented TCP as a C++ class that wraps around the native TCP
implementation to simulate a packet sniffer: After a TCP connection, messages that are
sent between the server and client are saved to a log file with its length.
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Figure 4.1: Diagram of Lempel-Ziv With Control and Feedback
We built our version of TLS on top of our TCP class. The UML, Figure 4.1, shows the
relation between the classes. On top, the TCP class is a packet sniffer: it saves the sent
or received messages using the Logger class, which saves those messages inside a log file.
The server and client are part of Applications. Both of them are using TLS/SSL class to
encrypt their messages before sending through TCP class, and decrypt it on receiving. The
AES algorithms are used to encrypt and decrypt the messages. We use CryptoPP library
for cryptography functions, such as encryption and decryption. AES uses symmetric keys,
which means that both server and client have a copy of the same key. We implemented
two key exchange protocol to establish the shared key: Diffie Hellman in ephemeral mode,
and Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA).
For the Diffie-Hellman protocol, DHE, the server and client establishes a shared key
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together. The server first sends a large prime number p and a base g that is used to
compute the shared multiplicative group. It computes its private key s, and public key gs,
and sends the latter to the client. After receiving the information, the client computes the
multiplicative group, then computes its private key c, and its public key, gc, which gets
sent to the server. Then, both server and client use the private key and the public key of
the other party to compute the shared key, (gs)c or (gc)s.
For the Rivest-Shamir-Adleman protocol, RSA, the client picks shared encryption key.
To securely send it to the server, the server sends a public key to the client. The client
then uses the public key to encrypt the picked shared key using RSA encryption algo-
rithm. Afterwards, the client sends it to the server, who decrypts it and uses it for secure
communications.
Our TLS/SSL implementation code can be found in Appendix A. This implementation
allows us to host a server, and have a client connect to it, and perform secure communica-
tions. The client sends HTTP headers to the server through this secured tunnel. However,
the message length is not hidden, since we can retrieve each length in the log file. By
retrieving the lengths with our logger TLS/SSL and by being able to append to the client
messages, we can mimic an attacker performing the compression side-channel attack.
4.2 Lempel-Ziv77 Implementation
Our Lempel-Ziv77 implementation is done using Python 2.7. We implement our own
version because Python 2.7 does not provide the algorithm, it only provides DEFLATE
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which is a combination of Lempel-Ziv and Huffman coding. We implemented software
version of the algorithm, Algorithm 1, and hardware version of the algorithm described
below. The code for both versions can be found in Appendix B.
4.2.1 Lempel-Ziv77 Original Version
The Lempel-Ziv77 compression algorithm is implemented step-by-step following the Lempel-
Ziv77 algorithm, Algorithm 1: for each character and the ones that follows, we try to find
the longest match within the sliding window, and if we find one, we replace the matched
string by a reference.
4.2.2 Lempel-Ziv Dictionary Version
We also implemented a hardware version of Lempel-Ziv77 compression algorithm [1]. In
the software version, for each character and the characters that follows, the algorithm
searches for matching strings inside the sliding window. This version uses multiple hash
tables, 8 in our case, for quick lookups following these steps below.
1. At the beginning, 8 empty dictionaries or hash tables are created. These hash tables
values are strings alongside their location in the file. The key is computed with a
hash function explained below. After the initialization is done, the compression can
begin.
2. The input file that will be compressed is being read 8 character at a time. These 8
characters are saved inside a working vector, called the shift vector. This shift vector
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has length of 16. When 8 characters are read, they are put at the end of the vector.
They will shift to the front of the vector when the next 8 are read.
3. From the shift vector, the 8 hashes are computed. Each of the first 8 characters
has its own hash values. The hash values are calculated by the ASCII value of the
character together with the ASCII values of the three that follows under the hashing
function below, Equation (4.1). Those hash values will be used to look up if any
matching strings are present in the hashing tables for string starting at each of the 8
positions.
hash(curr char(i)) =(curr char(i) 2)⊕ (curr char(i+ 1) 1)
⊕ curr char(i+ 2)⊕ curr char(i+ 3)
(4.1)
4. Once the hashes are computed, each of the 8 characters looks at the value at its hash
in each of the 8 dictionaries, and tries to find a matching string. So, for the first
8 characters, the algorithm performs 64 look ups, and returns at most 8 matching
strings.
5. After retrieving the values from the dictionaries, the algorithm will update 8 entries,
one for each dictionary. For each of the first 8 character, the substring of length 8
starting at that character is saved inside one of the dictionaries. The first substring
will be saved in the first dictionary, the second substring will be saved in the second
dictionary, and so on.
6. When all the matching strings are gathered, a selection process will choose which
matching string to keep. The selection algorithm works almost the same way as a
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scheduling algorithm. We first define some terms.
• A reach of a matching string is defined to be the position where a matching
string ends.
• A first valid position is defined to be the end of the last matching string of the
previous shift instance.
The selection process has six steps, listed below.
(a) Matching strings that are shorter than 3 characters are dropped.
(b) Matching strings that conflict with the first valid position are dropped.
(c) All the matching string’s reach are computed.
(d) The last matching string is always kept, so we can compute the next first valid
position.
(e) For two matching strings that have the same reach, the smaller one is dropped.
(f) Lastly, all the matching strings that overlaps with the last one are dropped.
This algorithm is not optimal: it drops potential optimal matches, and the dictionary
needs better keeping algorithms. For example, if the last matching string is three char-
acters long, but it overlaps with another that is 6 characters, the longer matching string
is dropped. Also, if the dictionary contains a longer string, it could be overwritten by a
shorter one since the hashing function only takes into account the first four characters of
the string. However, this algorithm is fast since it exchanges storage complexity for time
complexity: instead of doing a linear scan inside the sliding window, it uses a hash lookup
which is constant time.
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Chapter 5
Randomized LZ Compression to
Resist Compression Side-Channel
Attacks
In this chapter, we first analyse the compression side-channel attack (CSCA), then propose
three models to deter the attack, and finally present our simulation results of the CSCA
on our models.
5.1 Compression Side-Channel Attack
In this section, we present the algorithm of the compression side-channel attack, along with
an example, and we also prove the leakage of combining compression and encryption.
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5.1.1 Analysis of Compression Side-Channel Attack
The following algorithm, Algorithm 2, shows the execution steps of a compression side-
channel attack.
Algorithm 2 CSCA(http request)
1: header ← HTTP header from http request
2: known prefix← secret’s prefix from adversary
3: guess secret← empty string of length L set by adversary
4: for i = 0 to i = secret length do
5: L← empty list
6: for each ζ ∈ Σ do
7: guess secret[i]← ζ
8: gζ ← known prefix||guess secret[i]
9: Mζ ← header||gζ
10: Cζ ← Enc(LZ77(Mζ))
11: Cζ gets sent over network
12: lζ ← length(Cζ)
13: L.insert(lζ)
14: end for
15: guess secret[i]← {ζ|ζ = argminζ{lζ ∈ L}}
16: end for
17: return guess secret
We assume that the client’s computer is already infected by a malware that can only
manipulate HTTP requests before they get sent. We are also assuming that the adversary
can only inspect and retrieve the lengths of encrypted TCP packages on the network.
Additionally, we assume that the victim already made connection to a server, and has
established an authentication token that is located inside the header of HTTP request.
Before a victim client sends another HTTP request to the server, the request is first
held onto by the malware, and the whole HTTP header is retrieved in line 1.
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The adversary has already examined the format of the HTTP header and the cookie
within in line 2, and knows the prefix string that prepends the secret. The prefix string
has been already given to the malware. The malware first initiates an empty string,
guess secret, that will eventually become the real secret at the end of the algorithm on
line 3.
The malware uses guess secret to retrieve the real secret token within the HTTP
header. It knows in advance that the length of the secret is constant. It constructs a string
g as a concatination of known prefix and guess secret, and it will append g to the HTTP
header.
The guess secret is constructed in a particular way. The malware tries to guess each
character, one at a time, from left to right. For each i-th character in the guess secret,
the malware sets it to be one of the possible characters, ζ, from the alphabet set Σ, shown
in line 7.
Once a character is set in guess secret, the latter is appended to known prefix, which
becomes g and is then appended to the HTTP header in lines 8-9.
This new header, M , is compressed and encrypted, then gets sent to the server by the
client in lines 10-11.
Since the message will be going through the network, its length l can be retrieved by
sniffer at line 12. The lengths lζ for each ζ is then saved in a list L for later analysis, shown
in line 13.
After collecting all the lengths, the attacker analyses them and retrieve the message with
the shortest length, since the length of the encrypted header with wrong guesses is longer
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than the length of encrypted header with the correct guess. The forged guess secret[i]
inside this message corresponds to the correct character at i inside the real secret. In
other words, ζ that corresponds to the message with shortest length in L is the correct i
character inside the real token, shown in line 15.
Once all the characters are recovered one by one, guess secret will match the real secret
token within header, and the adversary can use this token, guess secret, to impersonate
the victim.
5.1.2 Compression Side-Channel Attack Example
The following example explains how we simulated a compression side-channel attack on the
following HTTP header. Lempel-Ziv77 was the compression algorithm used. This HTTP
header below is the raw HTTP header from accessing the website https://www.google.com.
Alt-Svc: quic=":443"; ma=2592000; v="34,
33,32,31,30,29,28,27,26,25"
...
Set-Cookie: NID=79=rAJMNHlcYMf6Vg3FxMIPE
kxRcLStbWDVxb7Dng9puqepumjZJ5nsRnOQbiOR0
MILZp8u-jHt2fExUTLMgVgb3MUYwdxbp2V7vb4YP
0LKxhHfx5e8bUekI4_Eo4NupdYpTDvsGqDfhgbG3
kWFw2y_yaNuQAhND4ULU1zCo0Eysyzv1nM6Y6zba
5MOfVj9zhbnltLCVAcoiYl5CeF7opB_DZ5vedm2d
bouqXle;
expires=Thu, 08-Dec-2016 21:59:58 GMT;
path=/; domain=.google.ca; HttpOnly
X-Firefox-Spdy: h2
...
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We will use the compression side-channel attack to retrieve the authentication token:
“rAJMNHlc ... Xle” hidden by encryption.
In the first step, we retrieve the header and examine the secret’s known prefix, which
is NID=79=. Then we create a forge string, g, which has the prefix NID=79=, and we add a
guessing character from the alphabet, Σ = a, b, · · · , z, A, · · ·Z. So, the first forged string g
takes the first letter of the alphabet as guess: g ← NID=79=a. Then, we appends g to the
end of the header. Before the header gets sent, it gets compressed by Lempel-Ziv77 and
encrypted by TLS. The content of the message is hidden, but the lengths of the ciphertext
is not. After collecting the length l, we try the second letter b as guess: g ← NID=79=b.
After trying all the alpabets, we can collect the length of each ciphertext containing a
different guess. By collecting all the lengths, we could determine that the ciphertext with
the shortest length corresponds to the message containing the forged string with guess
r. Thus, we can deduce that the first letter of the secret is r. These steps are repeated
for guessing the second letter of the secret, which would be A, and we repeat for all 225
characters. Then, the whole secret token “rAJMNHlc ... Xle” is recovered.
5.1.3 Analysis of Lempel-Ziv Against Compression Side-Channel
Attack
In this subsection, we analyse compression side-channel attack and prove that an adversary
can use it to retrieve any secrets within a encrypted message given that he knows the secret
prefix.
We represent the header together with the forged string as S shown below:
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S = s0s1 · · ·Pstst+1 · · · st+T · · ·Gxˆ
where si are characters, P is a string that represents the secret’s known prefix, st to
st+T represents the real secret of length T , G is the known prefix appended by correct
guessed characters, which is added by adversary, and xˆ is the next character currently
being guessed. We segment the file S into a list of sequence of strings, Qis.
S = s0s1 · · ·Pstst+1 · · · st+T · · ·Gxˆ
= Q0Q1 · · ·Qm
After the plaintext goes through compression, some sequence Qi would be replaced by
a Lempel-Ziv77 compression output ri = (position, length, next char) since it happened
before.
LZ77(S) = LZ77(s0s1 · · · sn)
= LZ77(Q0Q1 · · ·Qm)
= R = r0r1 · · · rl
We define length of the compressed file l =‖R‖ as the number of Lempel-Ziv77 outputs.
For the attack to be successful, the length of the compressed file with incorrect guess must
be longer than the file with correct guess: lxˆ 6=st > lxˆ=st . We will prove this case below.
Property 5.1.1. lxˆ 6=st = lxˆ=st + 1, where l is size of R.
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Proof. The prefix, P , and the first character of the secret, st, can be segmented in two
ways.
1. Pst ∈ Qu : both P and st are found in the same segment Qu.
2. P ∈ Qu and st ∈ Qu+1: P is found in Qu and sp is found in Qu+1.
The prefix and first character will be repeated in the forged string, which then will
become an Lempel-Ziv output tuple ri after compression.
We can eliminate the second case, since because if only the segment that contains P is
referenced, then st is included in the Lempel-Ziv output as the next character. Thus, we
can say that the prefix and the first character are in the same segment: Pst ∈ Qu.
Now we show that the length of the the message with the incorrect guess is larger than
one with correct guess.
After compression, the input file S becomes compressed file R.
• If the guess is correct, xˆ = st, then Gxˆ is compressed to only one output rl1 , that
references Qu. The compressed file R would have this output at the end: R =
r1r2 · · · rl1 .
• If the guess is incorrect, xˆ 6= st, then only the G is compressed since it matches the
prefix P in Qu. The output of compressing the prefix P is also rl1 (call this r
′
l1
) but
with a smaller value for length, and the guessing character xˆ is the next character.
However, the Lempel-Ziv77 algorithm also prints a terminal output rl2 that has a
new line as the next character to mark the end of the algorithm.
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The length of the compression result for the message with the correct guess is lxˆ0=st =
‖Rcorrect‖ where Rcorrect = r0r1 · · · rl1 . The length of the result with incorrect guess is
lxˆ0=st =‖Rincorrect‖ where Rincorrect = r0r1 · · · r′l1rl2 .
This clearly shows that the length has increased by one block, thus, lxˆ0 6=st = lxˆ0=st + 1.
To conclude, the length of the compressed file with incorrect guess is indeed longer than
the file with correct guess: lxˆ 6=st > lxˆ=st .
5.2 Adding Randomization to Lempel-Ziv77
In the following, we explain our motivation behind increasing the randomness of Lempel-
Ziv compression, then, we propose three methods built around Lempel-Ziv77 compression
algorithm before applying encryption to stand against compression side-channel attack.
The goal of each of the methods below is to make the compressed message’s length not
deterministic. With those models, the length of the message containing the forged token
with the correct guess is not shorter than length of the message containing the forged token
with the incorrect guess.
5.2.1 Length Analysis of Randomized LZ
Previously, we showed that an adversary can recover a secret from a cookie inside a web
browser. We will show how we can prevent this attack by adding randomness to LZ. Our
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goal is to prevent the attacker from guessing xˆ0. By varying the entropy of the plain-text
or by randomly padding the outputs of LZ compression, we can achieve lxˆ0 6=st ≥ lxˆ0=st .
With a pseudo-random sequence generator, we can use the output bits as a control to
change the entropy of the plaintext and the result of the compression won’t be obsolete:
the result with the correct guess could be larger than the result with an incorrect guess.
Alternatively, we could vary with control the results of the Lempel-Ziv compression. This
will provide us the same effect: lxˆ0 6=st ≥ lxˆ0=st .
Remark Shannon’s entropy is defined to be the number of bits needed to represent
the information. By this definition, since compression removed all the redundancy, the
entropy of the compressed text must be smaller than the entropy of the original plaintext.
The information that could not be compressed is shared between the plaintext and the
compressed plaintext, and this information is mutual information. If we add randomization
to the compression algorithm, the entropy of the compressed text would not decrease as
much, thus, increasing the mutual information, making the length of the compressed text
unpredictable. This unpredictability will hinder the attacker from doing a compressed
side-channel attack.
5.2.2 Model Elements
Before defining our models, we first look at some implementations that are used in the
models.
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Pseudorandom Sequence Generator
Our three schemes below use the same pseudorandom sequence generator, PRSG, which
generates a sequence of 0’s and 1’s. This PRSG is constructed based on the random number
generator in Python 2.7 that uses the Mersenne Twister algorithm to generate a floating
number in the range of 0 to 1 exclusively. The floating numbers has 53-bit precision floats
and a period of 219937 − 1.
Note on Security of Mersene Twister Mersenne twister is not cryptographic secure
[22]. However, we use it because of its fast speed. We also do not need it to be cryptographic
secure since we are adding randomness to our compression schemes, which is different from
encryption.
Weighted Generator We implemented a weighted pseudo-random number generator
that generates an uneven number of 0s and 1s. Specifially, the PRNG outputs 10% 1’s’ and
90% 0’s. Since the Mersenne Twister random number generator from Python can output
a random floating number between 0 and 1, we take this floating number to determine
whether to output 0 or 1. If the number is bigger than a given ratio, 0.1 for example, then
our generator outputs 0, and 1 otherwise.
The ratio must not stay 10% for each compression. It must vary or else the stronger
compression side-channel attack works. We modify the ratio before compressing each
file. First, our custom PRNG takes the original ratio (10%) specified by the user during
initialization. Then, the ratio would get adjusted between ratio − 0.01 and ratio + 0.01,
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with probability of a Gaussian distribution. For our case with 10% as the base ratio, this
will varie in the range of 9% to 11% in a Gaussian fashion. This Gaussian variation is done
using the Python random.gauss function: another floating number is generated between 0
and 1 with Gaussian distribution with a mean of 0.5 and a standard deviation of 0.25, then
its value decreases by 0.5 to make it between −0.5 and 0.5, and then multiplied by 0.02
to make its value between −0.01 and 0.01, finally this number gets added to our original
10% to get a variation of 0.01%.
Weak Stream Cipher
We are using a weak stream cipher to increase the entropy of a file without modifying it
too much. The weak stream cipher is being used. It uses our custom PRNG as bit-stream
input. It then performs XOR operation with the input file. The original message is only
transformed by little due to uneven distribution of 0’s and 1’s.
Lempel-Ziv77
The Lempel-Ziv77 compression algorithm is implemented in Python 2.7. Just as described
in Algorithm 1, a sliding window is created before the current character, and for each
character, the algorithm would look for the longest sequence that matches within the
sliding window.
32
Lempel-Ziv EncryptionHeader+Fi,j CWeaki,j
Stream
Figure 5.1: Diagram of Weak Cipher with Lempel-Ziv
5.2.3 Randomized Lempel-Ziv Models
By adding a pseudo-random number generator and the Lempel-Ziv77, we designed three
models to add randomness to a simple Lempel-Ziv77.
Scheme 1: Weak Cipher with Lempel-Ziv77
For this method, we first process the text by passing it through a weak stream cipher
before applying compression, shown in Figure 5.1. Since each message will have a different
entropy, they will all compress differently. So the transmitted message that has the shortest
length may not contain the forged token with the correct guess since its entropy may be
higher than a message with an incorrect guess due to the addition of the weak cipher.
The weak cipher is based on our PRSG. We changed the ratio from 10% to 1.308%
because we want 10% of the characters inside the plain-text to be changed. The 1.308%
came from 1− 8√0.9, because each character are 8 bits and we want the 8 bits to be all 0’s
90% of the time.
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Lempel-Ziv Control EncryptionHeader+Fi,j CLZWCi,j
Random Bits r
Figure 5.2: Diagram of Lempel-Ziv With Control
Scheme 2: Lempel-Ziv With Control
The idea behind Lempel-Ziv With Control, LZWC, Figure 5.2, is to repeat some of the
output tuples of Lempel-ZIv in order to mask the real length of the compressed output.
A random stream of bits, r, will be needed. Each of the outputs of Lempel-ZIv will be
matched with a bit in the stream r: when the bit is 1, then the output will be duplicated,
or else nothing happens.
Scheme 3: Lempel-Ziv With Control and Feedback
This method aims to add even more randomness around the Lempel-Ziv compression step
to prevent compression side-channel information leakage, Figure 5.3. First, the plain-text
is passed through a Lempel-Ziv77 compression algorithm. Then, some of its results are
duplicated the same way as LZWC did. Afterwards, the result would get decompressed,
then compressed again with Lempel-Ziv77.
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Lempel-Ziv
Lempel-Ziv
Decom-
press
Control
EncryptionHeader+Fi,j CLZWCi,j
Random Bits r
Figure 5.3: Diagram of Lempel-Ziv With Control and Feedback
5.3 Simulation Results for Randomized LZ Models
We programmed our three compression schemes in Python2.7 and tested them against
compression side-channel attacks.
5.3.1 Testing Environment
The simulated compression side-channel attack is run on our server that has the following
specifications.
Processors 80
CPU Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E7-L8867 @ 2.13GHz
RAM 529105932 kB
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The attack alongside the schemes are implemented in Python 2.7. The HTTP header
used to do the tests is the same as above, but with different secrets. We ran the attack on
6 different header files, each one with a different secret.
5.3.2 Compression Side-Channel Attack on original LZ77
We ran the compression side-channel attack, i.e. Algorithm 2, on the original compression
algorithm LZ77, i.e. Algorithm 1. Just as described above, a forged token with a guessing
character was added to the plain-text, which goes through LZ77 compression next; then
the attack measures the length of the compressed texts and selects the shortest one to be
the correct character. We were able to decode the secret within all the header files in a
short amount of time.
5.3.3 Compression Side-Channel Attack on LZ77 with Random-
izations
The same attack was tested on plain-texts which went through LZ77 compression algorithm
with addition of randomizations. As expected, all three compression schemes prevented
the attack: the attacker fails to decode the secret token within the HTTP header.
Compression Side-Channel Attack on LZ77 With Weak Cipher
The weak cipher that the plain-text goes through before being compressed increases the
entropy of the message. Since the plain-text changed, some original repetitions did not
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happen. So the forged token might not match the real token. The length of the compressed
text depends on how many repetitions that were kept. Thus, the attack does not succeed
since this increase in entropy hides the exact length of the plain-text.
Compression Side-Channel Attack on LZWC
By varying the output, the real length of the plain-text is also hidden. After the plain-text
has been compressed, some of its output pairs are duplicated. This duplication is random
and the plain-text with a correct forged token might have more duplicates than a plain-text
with an incorrect forged token; thus, the incorrect guess will result in more outputs after
the compression algorithm. This way, the attack will make a wrong guess, and won’t be
able to decode the secret.
Compression Side-Channel Attack on LZWFC
Similar to the previous scheme, this also prevents the compression side-channel attack.
This scheme adds more randomization by feeding the output back into the compression
algorithm, making the length of the compressed text even more random. Hence, this also
prevents the attack.
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Chapter 6
Strong Compression Side-Channel
Attack
The normal compression side-channel attack that BREACH and CRIME implement can be
prevented easily if the victim employs one of the three randomization methods to Lempel-
Ziv for compression. The randomness masks the length of the compressed files, which
would be deterministic without any randomness involved. This way, the attacker cannot
know for certain that the shortest encrypted message has the correct guess. However, the
methods cannot provide complete immunity against the attack described in this section.
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6.1 Model and Analysis of Strong Compression Side-
Channel Attack
A modified compression side-channel attack can still recover the token. We call this Strong
Compression Side-Channel Attack, shown in Algorithm 3.
Algorithm 3 Strong Compression Side Channel Attack(http request)
1: header ← HTTP header from http request
2: known prefix← secret’s prefix from adversary
3: guess secret← empty string of length L set by adversary
4: for i = 0 to i = secret length do
5: L← empty list
6: for each ζ ∈ Σ do
7: guess secret[i]← ζ
8: gζ ← known prefix||guess secret
9: Mζ ← header||gζ
10: T ← empty list
11: for j = 0 to j = K do
12: Cζ ← Enc(LZ77(Mζ))
13: Cζ gets sent over network
14: lζ ← length(Cζ)
15: T.insert(lζ)
16: end for
17: L.insert(avg(T ))
18: end for
19: guess secret[i]← {ζ|ζ = argminζ{lζ ∈ L}}
20: end for
21: return guess secret
The strong compression side-channel attack is similar to the normal one, Algorithm 2,
but with a few differences listed below:
(1) After compressing and encrypting the message, instead of sending only one single
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request for each character ζj, the adversary makes the victim send K requests per
character, line 11. The adversary then collects the lengths of allK encrypted requests,
and saves all of them in a new list T , shown in lines 14-15.
(2) Then the adversary computes the average of all K messages that has the same guess-
ing character ζ, and saves that average in the list L, shown in line 17.
The last part is the same as the normal attack: the adversary chooses the character
that gives the lowest average to be the guessed character, shown in line 19.
6.2 Results from Simulation of Strong Compression
Side-Channel Attack on Randomized LZ Models
The same testing environment, which was described above, was used to simulate a strong
compression side-channel attack on our three randomized LZ models.
6.2.1 Strong Compression Side-Channel Attack on Randomized
LZ Models
The modified LZ77 with randomizations can successfully prevent a normal compression
side-channel attack. In this section, we will see how they do against a strong compression
side-channel attack.
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Strong Compression Side-Channel Attack on LZ77 With Weak Cipher
In Figure 6.1, the red line indicates the length of the compressed plain-text with a forged
token with correct guess, and blue lines indicates the ones with incorrect guesses. We see
that for most of the cases, the attack can hardly recover one character after 2000 requests.
Thus, this scheme is capable of resisting against a strong compression side-channel attack.
Strong Compression Side-Channel Attack on LZWC
Unlike the previous scheme, this one does not resist the strong compression side-channel
attack very well. From Figure 6.2, 300 requests were enough to decode one character in
most cases.
Strong Compression Side-Channel Attack on LZWCF
The testing results of LZWCF are displayed in Figure 6.3. As shown in the graphs, LZWCF
does better than LZWC, but still cannot prevent the strong compression side-channel
attack. To guess one correct character, 500 requests is usually enough.
6.2.2 Compression Rate
In Table 6.1, we present the different compression ratio from our randomized LZ models.
From the table, we see that our schemes have (.879 − .792)/.792 = 11.0%, (.881 −
.792)/.792 = 11.2%, (.943− .792)/.792 = 19.1% increase in the compressed size.
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(a) Token 1 (b) Token 2
(c) Token 3 (d) Token 4
(e) Token 5 (f) Token 6
Figure 6.1: Results of SCSCA on LZ with Weak Cipher
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(a) Token 1 (b) Token 2
(c) Token 3 (d) Token 4
(e) Token 5 (f) Token 6
Figure 6.2: Results of SCSCA on LZWC
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(a) Token 1 (b) Token 2
(c) Token 3 (d) Token 4
(e) Token 5 (f) Token 6
Figure 6.3: Results of SCSCA on LZWCF
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Scheme Worst Compression Size (in bytes) Compression Size vs Original Size
lz 445 0.792
lz with weak 494 0.879
lzwc 495 0.881
lzwcf 530 0.943
Table 6.1: Compression Ratio from Each Schemes
Our three randomized LZ model schemes prevent normal compression side-channel
attack, however, the size of the compressed message is increased as the trade-off.
6.2.3 Timing
The downside of strong compression side-channel attack is that it requires a long time to
execute. In this section, we investigate the time it take to resolve one secret of length 228.
During testing, the time to guess one character using iterations is also recorded. The
Figure 6.4 shows the average time it takes to append the forged token and to compress.
The graphs explain the relative time across all three schemes. The scheme LZWC has
the fastest time: 482 seconds for the attack with 2000 iterations. The two other schemes,
LZWeak and LZWCF, are twice as slow: 837 and 949 seconds respectively for the same
number of iterations.
Previously, we have seen that LZWeak requires more than 2000 requests, so to decode
one secret, the attack needs 837×228 = 190836seconds ≈ 53hours to decode one secret. For
LZWC, 300 iterations take 72 seconds to execute, so the total time it takes is 72× 228 =
16416seconds ≈ 5hours. For LZWCF, 500 iterations take 237 seconds to execute, so the
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(a) LZWeak Average Time (b) LZWC Average Time
(c) LZWCF Average Time
Figure 6.4: Timing Graphs of SCSCA on Randomized LZ Models
total time taken would be 237× 228 = 54036seconds ≈ 15hours. These hours are only the
time it takes to compress, more hours will be added for encryption and transmission.
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6.2.4 Number of Requests
When performing the strong compression side-channel attack, we assumed that we can send
an unlimited number of HTTP headers to the oracle, the server in this case. However, in
practice, sending that many requests is easily detectable by the server. If the server sets
a limit on the number of requests a client can make, then it would nullify this strong
compression side-channel attack. Thus, strong compression side-channel attack is only
possible if the oracle allows an enormous number of requests.
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Chapter 7
PermuLZ
The principle idea of the three models described previously is to manipulate the output
lengths so that they are not deterministic from the compression algorithm. So far, the
schemes are only manipulate outputs without changing the inputs. Only Lempel-Ziv with
Weak Cipher model changes the input of the file, but it changes the inputs only by a little.
7.1 PermuLZ Description
The main idea of PermuLZ is to cut the input file into many small blocks, move them
around, and then pass the file to the compression algorith.
Each run will have a different permutation, giving a different ciphertext length. Having
undeterministic ciphertext lengths hinders the adversary performing a compression side-
channel attack. The proof below explains how this generates undeterministic lengths.
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Algorithm 4 PermuLZ(input file, permutation key)
1: B,P ← empty list of strings
2: B ← split(input file)
3: P ← permutate(B, permutation key)
4: C ← Enc(LZ(P ))
5: return C
Proof. Let S be the input file and B be list of equal-sized blocks splits the string S.
S = s0s1s3s4 · · · sk
B = b1b2 · · · bl
Assume si to sj is the secret, when splitting the block, the cut will happen in one or
two places inside the secret. Assuming the cut only happens once at position sd. Let Bs1
and Bs2 be the two blocks that cointains the two parts of secret that get cut.
Bs1 = sisi+1 · · · sd
Bs2 = sd+1sd+2 · · · sj
If permutation is equally distributed, Bs1 and Bs2 won’t be next to each other, since
Bs1 has equal chance of being placed in front of any other blocks. The first letter of other
blocks are not necessarily sd+1. When compression side-channel attack guessed sd, it will
try to guess sd+1. But the algorithm will make the wrong guess, since other letters are
equally likely to happen because they are from other blocks. Thus, in theory, this can
resist strong compression sidechannel attack.
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Chapter 8
Conclusion and Future Work
In this chapter, we restate the conclusion of our thesis and highlight the potential improve-
ment that is necessary for future growth.
8.1 Conclusion
With the implementation of our own TLS/SSL and Lempel-Ziv77 compression algorithm,
we simulated compression side-channel attack and successfully retrieved the secret inside
an encrypted HTTP header.
We proposed three models that add randomization around Lempel-Ziv77 to resist to
compression side-channel attacks. The three models proposed are: Lempel-Ziv with Weak
Cipher, Lempel-Ziv with Control, and Lempel-Ziv with Controlled Feedback. Those models
encourage secure communication to re-enable compression inside TLS/SSL, since they
50
could be implemented in the server and client: hence, an additional key is needed to
synchronize the randomizations, and a small amount of time overhead is added compared
to Lempel-Ziv77.
The main idea of the models is to confuse the adversary by removing the determin-
istic property of the lengths from outputs of Lempel-Ziv compression. The first model,
Lempel-Ziv with Weak Cipher, uses a weak cipher to change some bytes of the input,
then the outputs gets compressed using Lempel-Ziv compression algorithm. The second
model, Lempel-Ziv with Control, performs compression first, then it repeats the outputs
controlled by a pseudorandom sequence generator. The third model, Lempel-Ziv with
Controlled Feedback, repeats outputs just like the second model, but it then uncompress
it, and compresses again. The three models deter the compression side-channel attack by
modifying the deterministic feature of compression length. When the attacking program is
guessing the correct character, it corrolates the compressed-then-encrypted message with
the shortest length to the correct guess. By having compression length as undeterministic,
adversary could not perform compression side-channel attack, because the correct guess
does not correspond to the message with the shortest length.
Using our internal server, we first simulated a compression side-channel attack against
a server that uses Lempel-Ziv77 as compression algorithm. We managed to successfully
retrieve the secret within a HTTPS Header. Afterwards, we tested the same attack us-
ing our three models, and all three models successfully hide the secret, thus preventing
compression side-channel attack.
To test the limit of our schemes, we created a better version of the compression side-
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channel attack, called strong compression side-channel attack. This attack requires the
adversary to make multiple queries for one guess. From those queries, the adversary can
collect all the undeterministic lengths and calculates the mean of all the lengths. With the
means, the adversary can deduce that the character with lowest mean must correspond to
the actual character of the secret.
Our three schemes failed to resist the stronger compression side-channel attack if the
attacker is allowed to make a large number of queries. However, they can still be used
in practice since the attack takes a long time to decode the secret within the header. If
an attacker launches this attack, then the Lempel-Ziv with Weak Cipher scheme requires
more than 2000 requests to be sent per character, and this would require more than 53
hours. For the Lempel-Ziv with Control, the secret would be safe for 5 hours, and for
Lempel-Ziv with Controlled Feedback, the secret couldn’t be retrieved within less than 15
hours. Thus, if the secret expired before the given time, then the attack fails because the
recovered token is already expired.
The compression ratios of the three models did not decrease significantly: Lempel-Ziv
with Weak Cipher model ratio increased by 11%; Lempel-Ziv with Control model increased
by 11.2%; and Lempel-Ziv with Controlled Feedback increased by 19.1%. So, our models
provides more security, but with a compression rate loss.
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8.2 Future Work
8.2.1 Entropy Analysis
We fixed our bit-stream generator to generate 1’s ten percent of the time, and 0 ninty
percent of the time. We could analyse the ratio of our bit-stream generator in depth with
other file types, since all HTTP headers have similar entropy. For instance, XML files
have less entropy and could be better compressed than HTTP header by Lempel-Ziv77.
By simulating the attack on our models with different file types, we can determine the
best ratio for each file type. If we could establish relationships between file entropy and
randomness required to prevent compression side-channel attack, then we could maximizing
security while minimizing compression loss.
8.2.2 PermuLZ Implementation
We expect PermuLZ to resist the compression side-channel attack. When the file is be-
ing fragmented into blocks, the secret token is fragmented and the secret fragments are
rearranged. Even if the adversary could retrieve all the secret fragments, to figure out the
correct chronological fragment order has the same time complexity as a permutation of n
elements, O(n!). We also expect to reach a better compression ratio as our first scheme,
Lempel-Ziv with weak cipher. The entropy of the plaintext may not vary as much. Shorter
repeated strings could be found unchanged, but in different fragments, so file would still
be compressed. However, longer repated strings cannot be compressed as well as shorter
strings, because they are fragmented, where as these would compress less. Overall, Per-
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muLZ provides compression and security. It could be used as a possible solution in the
future as a compression algorithm used prior to encryption.
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Appendix A
C++ Code for TLS/SSL Protocol
A.1 TLS/SSL Client Connection Code
The following function is used by the client to connect to a server and do handshake to
establish a shared encryption key.
int SslClient::connect(
const std::string &ip, int port,
uint16_t cxntype)
{
// connect
if ( this->tcp_->socket_connect(ip, port) != 0 ) {
cerr << "Couldn’t connect" << endl;
return -1;
}
// send client hello
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Record client_hello_record;
client_hello_record.hdr.type = REC_HANDSHAKE;
client_hello_record.hdr.version = VER_99;
client_hello_record.hdr.length =
sizeof(HS_CLIENT_HELLO) + sizeof(cxntype);
char* data = (char*)malloc(client_hello_record.hdr.length*sizeof(char));
memcpy(data, &HS_CLIENT_HELLO, sizeof(HS_CLIENT_HELLO));
memcpy( &(data[sizeof(HS_CLIENT_HELLO)]), &cxntype, sizeof(cxntype));
client_hello_record.data = data;
if ( this->send(client_hello_record) != 0 ) {
cerr << "Couldn’t send client hello" << endl;
return -1;
}
free(data);
switch ( cxntype ) {
case KE_DH:
case KE_DHE: {
// wait for server hello
Record server_hello_record;
if ( this->recv(&server_hello_record) != 0 ) {
cerr << "Couldn’t receive server hello" << endl;
return -1;
}
if ( server_hello_record.hdr.type != REC_HANDSHAKE ) {
cerr << "Not a handshake message." << endl;
return -1;
}
uint8_t handshake_type;
memcpy(&handshake_type, server_hello_record.data,
sizeof(handshake_type));
if ( handshake_type != HS_SERVER_HELLO ) {
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cerr << "Not a server hello message."
<< server_hello_record.data << endl;
return -1;
}
string pqg_gs( &(server_hello_record.data[sizeof(handshake_type)]),
server_hello_record.hdr.length
- sizeof(handshake_type));
free(server_hello_record.data);
string p;
string q;
string g;
string gs;
size_t found_p;
found_p = pqg_gs.find("x", 0);
if ( found_p == string::npos ) {
cerr << "Couldn’t find p." << endl;
return -1;
}
p = pqg_gs.substr(0, found_p);
// cout << "P:" << p << endl;
size_t found_q;
found_q = pqg_gs.find("x", found_p+1);
if ( found_q == string::npos ) {
cerr << "Couldn’t find q." << endl;
return -1;
}
q = pqg_gs.substr(found_p+1, found_q - found_p - 1);
// cout << "Q:" << q << endl;
size_t found_g;
found_g = pqg_gs.find("x", found_q+1);
if ( found_g == string::npos ) {
cerr << "Couldn’t find g." << endl;
return -1;
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}g = pqg_gs.substr(found_q+1, found_g - found_q - 1);
// cout << "G:" << g << endl;
gs = pqg_gs.substr(found_g+1);
// cout << "G^s:" << gs << endl;
CryptoPP::Integer dh_p(p.c_str());
CryptoPP::Integer dh_q(q.c_str());
CryptoPP::Integer dh_g(g.c_str());
CryptoPP::AutoSeededRandomPool rnd;
CryptoPP::DH dh_client;
dh_client.AccessGroupParameters().Initialize(dh_p, dh_q, dh_g);
if ( !dh_client.GetGroupParameters().ValidateGroup(rnd, 3) ) {
cerr << "Failed to generate dh_client." << endl;
return -1;
}
// generate client gc
CryptoPP::SecByteBlock priv_client(dh_client.PrivateKeyLength());
CryptoPP::SecByteBlock pub_client(dh_client.PublicKeyLength());
dh_client.GenerateKeyPair(rnd, priv_client, pub_client);
// send client key exchange gc
Record client_ke_record;
client_ke_record.hdr.type = REC_HANDSHAKE;
client_ke_record.hdr.version = VER_99;
client_ke_record.hdr.length = sizeof(HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) +
dh_client.PublicKeyLength();
char* ke_data = (char*)malloc(
client_ke_record.hdr.length*sizeof(char));
memcpy( ke_data,
&HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, sizeof(HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE));
memcpy( &(ke_data[sizeof(HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE)]),
pub_client.BytePtr(), pub_client.SizeInBytes());
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client_ke_record.data = ke_data;
if ( this->send(client_ke_record) != 0 ) {
cerr << "Couldn’t send client key exchange g^c." << endl;
return -1;
}
free(ke_data);
// compute key
CryptoPP::SecByteBlock pub_server((const unsigned char*)gs.c_str(),
dh_client.PublicKeyLength());
CryptoPP::SecByteBlock dh_key(dh_client.AgreedValueLength());
if( !dh_client.Agree(dh_key, priv_client, pub_server) ) {
cerr << "Client: Failed to compute shared key." << endl;
return -1;
}
// compute SHA 256 of key
CryptoPP::SecByteBlock shared_key(CryptoPP::SHA256::DIGESTSIZE);
CryptoPP::SHA256().CalculateDigest(shared_key,
dh_key, dh_key.size());
// save key inside client connection
set_shared_key(shared_key.BytePtr(), shared_key.SizeInBytes());
// log shared keys
this->logger_->log_raw("DH Key:");
this->logger_->log_raw((const char*)dh_key.BytePtr(),
dh_key.SizeInBytes());
this->logger_->log_raw("Shared Key:");
this->logger_->log_raw((char *)this->shared_key_,
this->shared_key_len_);
} break;
case KE_RSA: {
// wait for server hello
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Record server_hello_record;
if ( this->recv(&server_hello_record) != 0 ) {
cerr << "Couldn’t receive server hello" << endl;
return -1;
}
if ( server_hello_record.hdr.type != REC_HANDSHAKE ) {
cerr << "Not a handshake message." << endl;
return -1;
}
uint8_t handshake_type;
memcpy(&handshake_type,
server_hello_record.data, sizeof(handshake_type));
if ( handshake_type != HS_SERVER_HELLO ) {
cerr << "Not a server hello message."
<< server_hello_record.data << endl;
return -1;
}
// retrieve n and e, then compute public key
string server_ne(
&(server_hello_record.data[sizeof(handshake_type)]),
-sizeof(handshake_type) + server_hello_record.hdr.length );
free(server_hello_record.data);
string server_n_str;
string server_e_str;
size_t found_n;
found_n = server_ne.find("x", 0);
if ( found_n == string::npos ) {
cerr << "Couldn’t find n." << endl;
return -1;
}
server_n_str = server_ne.substr(0, found_n);
server_e_str = server_ne.substr(found_n+1);
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// cout << "n:" << server_n_str << endl;
// cout << "e:" << server_e_str << endl;
CryptoPP::Integer server_n(server_n_str.c_str());
CryptoPP::Integer server_e(server_e_str.c_str());
CryptoPP::RSA::PublicKey server_pk;
server_pk.Initialize(server_n, server_e);
// encrypt shared key using server public key
CryptoPP::AutoSeededRandomPool rng;
CryptoPP::SecByteBlock shared_key(
0x00, CryptoPP::AES::DEFAULT_KEYLENGTH);
rng.GenerateBlock(shared_key, shared_key.size());
string shared_key_str((const char*)shared_key.BytePtr(),
shared_key.SizeInBytes());
string encrypted_shared_key;
if ( rsa_encrypt(server_pk, &encrypted_shared_key,
shared_key_str) != 0 ) {
cerr << "Couldn’t encrypt shared key." << endl;
return -1;
}
// send shared key
Record client_ke_record;
client_ke_record.hdr.type = REC_HANDSHAKE;
client_ke_record.hdr.version = VER_99;
client_ke_record.hdr.length = sizeof(HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE)
+ encrypted_shared_key.length();
char* ke_data = (char*)malloc(
client_ke_record.hdr.length*sizeof(char));
memcpy( ke_data,
&HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, sizeof(HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE));
memcpy( &(ke_data[sizeof(HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE)]),
encrypted_shared_key.c_str(),
encrypted_shared_key.length());
66
client_ke_record.data = ke_data;
if ( this->send(client_ke_record) != 0 ) {
cerr << "Couldn’t send client key exchange E(Pk_s, key)."
<< endl;
return -1;
}
free(ke_data);
// set shared key
set_shared_key(shared_key.BytePtr(), shared_key.SizeInBytes());
} break;
default : {
cerr << "Unexpected KE type:" << hex << cxntype << endl;
return -1;
}
}
return 0;
}
A.2 TLS/SSL Server Connection Code
The following function is used by the server to connect to a client and do handshake to
establish a shared encryption key.
SSL* SslServer::accept() {
if ( this->closed_ ) {
return NULL;
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}TCP* cxn = this->tcp_->socket_accept();
if ( cxn == NULL ) {
cerr << "error when accepting" << endl;
return NULL;
}
cxn->set_logger(this->logger_);
SSL* new_ssl_cxn = new SSL(cxn);
// wait for CLIENT_HELLO
Record client_hello_record;
if ( new_ssl_cxn->recv(&client_hello_record) != 0 ) {
cerr << "Didn’t receive message after accepting." << endl;
return NULL;
}
// extract record_type / handshake_type
if ( client_hello_record.hdr.type != REC_HANDSHAKE ) {
cerr << "Not a handshake message." << endl;
return NULL;
}
uint8_t handshake_type;
memcpy( &handshake_type,
client_hello_record.data, sizeof(handshake_type));
if ( handshake_type != HS_CLIENT_HELLO ) {
cerr << "Not a client hello message." << endl;
return NULL;
}
uint16_t key_exchange_type = 0;
memcpy( &key_exchange_type,
&(client_hello_record.data[sizeof(HS_CLIENT_HELLO)]),
sizeof(key_exchange_type));
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// clean up
free(client_hello_record.data);
// check what kind of key agreement
switch ( key_exchange_type ) {
case KE_DH: // todo:
case KE_DHE: {
// create a new record
Record server_hello_record;
server_hello_record.hdr.type = REC_HANDSHAKE;
server_hello_record.hdr.version = VER_99;
// send server hello
string p, q, g, gs;
ostringstream oss;
oss << dh_p_;
p = oss.str();
oss.str("");
oss << dh_q_;
q = oss.str();
oss.str("");
oss << dh_g_;
g = oss.str();
CryptoPP::AutoSeededRandomPool rnd;
CryptoPP::DH dh_server;
dh_server.AccessGroupParameters().Initialize(dh_p_, dh_q_, dh_g_);
if ( !dh_server.GetGroupParameters().ValidateGroup(rnd, 3) ) {
cerr << "Failed to generate dh_server." << endl;
return NULL;
}
CryptoPP::SecByteBlock priv_server(dh_server.PrivateKeyLength());
CryptoPP::SecByteBlock pub_server(dh_server.PublicKeyLength());
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dh_server.GenerateKeyPair(rnd, priv_server, pub_server);
string pqg_data = p + "x" + q + "x" + g + "x";
server_hello_record.hdr.length = sizeof(HS_SERVER_HELLO)
+ pqg_data.length()
+ pub_server.SizeInBytes();
char* data = (char*)malloc(
sizeof(char)*( server_hello_record.hdr.length ));
memcpy(data, &HS_SERVER_HELLO, sizeof(HS_SERVER_HELLO));
memcpy( &(data[sizeof(HS_SERVER_HELLO)]),
pqg_data.c_str(), pqg_data.length());
memcpy( &(data[sizeof(HS_SERVER_HELLO)+pqg_data.length()]),
pub_server.BytePtr(), pub_server.SizeInBytes());
server_hello_record.data = data;
// send server hello
if ( new_ssl_cxn->send(server_hello_record) != 0 ) {
cerr << "Couldn’t send server hello." << endl;
return NULL;
}
free(server_hello_record.data);
// wait for client key exchange g^c
Record client_ke_record;
if ( new_ssl_cxn->recv(&client_ke_record) != 0 ) {
cerr << "Didn’t receive g^c." << endl;
return NULL;
}
if ( client_ke_record.hdr.type != REC_HANDSHAKE ) {
cerr << "Not a handshake message." << endl;
return NULL;
}
uint8_t handshake_type;
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memcpy( &handshake_type,
client_ke_record.data, sizeof(handshake_type));
if ( handshake_type != HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE ) {
cerr << "Not a client key exchange message." << endl;
return NULL;
}
// extract
CryptoPP::SecByteBlock pub_client(
(const unsigned char*)
&(client_ke_record.data[sizeof(HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE)]),
dh_server.PublicKeyLength());
free(client_ke_record.data);
// compute key
CryptoPP::SecByteBlock dh_key(dh_server.AgreedValueLength());
if( !dh_server.Agree(dh_key, priv_server, pub_client) ) {
cerr << "Server: Failed to compute shared key." << endl;
return NULL;
}
// compute SHA 256 of key
CryptoPP::SecByteBlock shared_key(CryptoPP::SHA256::DIGESTSIZE);
CryptoPP::SHA256().CalculateDigest(
shared_key, dh_key, dh_key.size());
// save key inside client connection
new_ssl_cxn->set_shared_key(
shared_key.BytePtr(), shared_key.SizeInBytes());
// log shared keys
this->logger_->log_raw("DH Key:");
this->logger_->log_raw((const char*)dh_key.BytePtr(),
dh_key.SizeInBytes());
this->logger_->log_raw("Shared Key:");
this->logger_->log_raw((char *)this->shared_key_,
this->shared_key_len_);
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} break;
case KE_RSA: {
// prepare server hello
Record server_hello_record;
server_hello_record.hdr.type = REC_HANDSHAKE;
server_hello_record.hdr.version = VER_99;
string n, e;
ostringstream oss;
oss << this->private_key_.GetModulus();
n = oss.str();
oss.str("");
oss << this->private_key_.GetPublicExponent();
e = oss.str();
string ne_data = n + "x" + e;
server_hello_record.hdr.length =
sizeof(HS_SERVER_HELLO) + ne_data.length();
char* data = (char*)malloc(
sizeof(char)*( server_hello_record.hdr.length ));
memcpy(data, &HS_SERVER_HELLO, sizeof(HS_SERVER_HELLO));
memcpy( &(data[sizeof(HS_SERVER_HELLO)]),
ne_data.c_str(), ne_data.length());
server_hello_record.data = data;
// send server hello
if ( new_ssl_cxn->send(server_hello_record) != 0 ) {
cerr << "Couldn’t send server hello." << endl;
return NULL;
}
free(server_hello_record.data);
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// wait for client key exchange shared key
Record client_ke_record;
if ( new_ssl_cxn->recv(&client_ke_record) != 0 ) {
cerr << "Didn’t receive shared key." << endl;
return NULL;
}
if ( client_ke_record.hdr.type != REC_HANDSHAKE ) {
cerr << "Not a handshake message." << endl;
return NULL;
}
uint8_t handshake_type;
memcpy( &handshake_type,
client_ke_record.data, sizeof(handshake_type));
if ( handshake_type != HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE ) {
cerr << "Not a client key exchange message." << endl;
return NULL;
}
// extract
string encrypted_shared_key(
&(client_ke_record.data[sizeof(HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE)]),
-sizeof(HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) + client_ke_record.hdr.length);
free(client_ke_record.data);
// decrypt shared key
string shared_key;
rsa_decrypt(this->private_key_, &shared_key, encrypted_shared_key);
// save key inside client connection
new_ssl_cxn->set_shared_key(
(const unsigned char*)shared_key.c_str(), shared_key.length());
// log shared keys
this->logger_->log_raw("Shared Key:");
this->logger_->log_raw((char *)this->shared_key_,
this->shared_key_len_);
73
} break;
default:
cerr << "Unexpected KE type:" << hex << key_exchange_type << endl;
return NULL;
}
this->clients_.push_back(new_ssl_cxn);
return new_ssl_cxn;
}
A.3 TLS/SSL Encryption Code
The following function is used by both the server and client to encrypt and decrypt messages
using the shared key.
int SSL::send(const std::string &send_str) {
// make a record
Record send_record;
send_record.hdr.type = REC_APP_DATA;
send_record.hdr.version = VER_99;
// encrypt
string cipher_text;
if ( aes_encrypt(this->shared_key_, this->shared_key_len_,
&cipher_text, send_str) != 0 ) {
cerr << "Couldn’t encrypt." << endl;
return -1;
}
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char* data = (char*)malloc(cipher_text.length()*sizeof(char));
memcpy(data, cipher_text.c_str(), cipher_text.length());
send_record.data = data;
// add length to record
send_record.hdr.length = cipher_text.length();
// send
int ret_code;
ret_code = send(send_record);
free(send_record.data);
return ret_code;
}
int SSL::recv(std::string *recv_str) {
// receive record
Record recv_record;
if ( recv(&recv_record) == -1 ) {
cerr << "Couldn’t receive." << endl;
return -1;
}
// check
if ( recv_record.hdr.type != REC_APP_DATA) {
cerr << "Not app data." << endl;
return -1;
}
// extract
string cipher_text(recv_record.data, recv_record.hdr.length);
free(recv_record.data);
// decrypt
if ( aes_decrypt(this->shared_key_, this->shared_key_len_,
recv_str, cipher_text) != 0 ) {
cerr << "Couldn’t decrypt." << endl;
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return -1;
}
return 0;
}
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Appendix B
Python2.7 Code for Lempel-Ziv77
Compression
Below contains the software and hardware implementation of Lempel-Ziv77 compression
algorithm.
B.1 Software Version
The software version is written in Python 2.7. It looks for the repeating string by using a
scanning window described in the original Lempel-Ziv77 algorithm, Algorithm 1.
def compress(self, filename):
# init
search_buffer = None
77
look_ahead_buffer = None
outputs = []
# open file and process
with open(filename) as fp:
while True:
# compute the two buffers
search_buffer, look_ahead_buffer, preview, end = \
self._get_buffers(search_buffer, look_ahead_buffer, fp)
if end:
break
# print "search:la \t %s:%s %s" % \
# (search_buffer, look_ahead_buffer, preview)
# find match
match_pos, match_len = \
self._find_match(search_buffer, look_ahead_buffer)
# compute next char
if match_len == len(look_ahead_buffer):
next_char = preview
elif match_len < len(look_ahead_buffer):
next_char = look_ahead_buffer[match_len:match_len+1]
else:
next_char = ""
# shift the buffers
for i in xrange(match_len):
search_buffer, look_ahead_buffer, ignore, end = \
self._get_buffers(search_buffer,
look_ahead_buffer, fp)
# add to output
outputs.append(OutEle(match_pos, match_len, next_char))
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# end while loop
# check last element, add EOF if needed
if len(outputs) > 0:
if outputs[-1].next_char != ’’:
outputs.append(OutEle(None, 0, ’’))
return outputs
B.2 Hardware Version
The hardware version of the algorithm is more complex, since it trade for faster run-time.
It uses dictionaries for faster look-ups than linearly scanning the sliding window.
def lz_compress(i_file, i_chunk_size,
i_dict_rows, i_dict_entry_len, i_min_select_len):
""" Compress a file
Inputs:
- i_file (file):
file to read
- i_chunk_size (int):
chunk size to read at each iteration
- i_dict_entry_len (int):
max length of each dict entry
- i_min_select_len (int):
drops matches that are < than this length
Output:
- outputs:
list of OutEle
"""
# todo: check inputs
79
# init local variables
dictionary = init_table(i_chunk_size, i_dict_rows,
DictEntry(entry=None, location=-1))
data_vector = [None] * i_chunk_size * 2
data_vector_hash = [0] * i_chunk_size
curr_dict_read = init_table(i_chunk_size, i_chunk_size)
longest_matches = [None] * i_chunk_size
curr_pos = 0
first_valid_pos = 0
outputs = []
# compress loop
datafile = open(i_file, ’r’)
while True:
debug("new iteration")
debug2("curr pos:%d" % curr_pos)
debug("read new data ... ")
read_len = read_file(data_vector, datafile, i_chunk_size)
debug2("read len:%d" % read_len)
if read_len == -1:
debug("nothing more to read, compression ends ...")
break
debug2(data_vector)
debug("computing hashes ... ")
get_hashes(data_vector_hash, data_vector)
debug2(data_vector_hash)
debug("reading dictionary ... ")
read_dictionary(curr_dict_read, dictionary, data_vector_hash)
debug("updating dictionary ... ")
update_dictionary(dictionary, data_vector, curr_pos,
data_vector_hash, i_dict_entry_len)
debug("find longest match ... ")
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find_longest_matches(longest_matches, data_vector,
curr_dict_read, i_chunk_size)
debug2("longests=%s" % longest_matches)
debug("selecting match ... ")
new_first_valid_pos, chosen_indices = \
select_match(data_vector, longest_matches,
first_valid_pos, i_min_select_len)
debug2(new_first_valid_pos)
debug2(chosen_indices)
debug("generating outputs ... ")
curr_outputs = \
gen_outputs(data_vector, curr_pos, first_valid_pos,
chosen_indices, longest_matches)
# add output to list of outputs
for o in curr_outputs:
outputs.append(o)
# set values for next iteration
curr_pos += i_chunk_size
first_valid_pos = new_first_valid_pos
# loop ends
# close file
datafile.close()
print_dictionary(dictionary)
return outputs
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Appendix C
Python Code for Making a PDF Plot
We used plotting functions from matplotlib packages in Python 2.7 to plot our attack and
time data.
C.1 Data Plot
The function, main(), takes in the length of all datas from the attack and plots them on
a graph, with the red line being the letter corresponding to guess character being correct.
def main():
args = parse_args()
print args
# init vars
in_file = args.file
82
out_file = args.output
title = args.title
correct_char = args.char
# read data
dictionary = load_file(in_file)
data = dictionary[DICTKEY_DATA]
# create figure
fig = plt.figure(title)
fig.suptitle(title, fontsize=14, fontweight=’bold’)
plt.ylabel(’False Positives (%)’)
plt.xlabel(’Number of Rounds’)
# plot in data
# count # different keys
all_keys = sorted(data.keys())
total_chars = len(all_keys)
# allocate the 2D array
columns = data[all_keys[0]].keys()
columns = sorted(columns, key=lambda s: int(s))
columns = columns[1:]
dataframe = DataFrame(index=all_keys, columns=columns)
dataframe = dataframe.fillna(method=’backfill’)
# fill 2D array with data (cols = # of rounds, rows = alphabets)
for k in all_keys:
for col in columns:
dataframe[col][k] = data[k][col]
# print dataframe
# make a list of data
y = []
for col in columns:
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# get all lengths
all_len = dataframe[col]
# gather number of false pos
real_len = all_len[correct_char]
all_len = all_len.drop(correct_char)
num_false_pos = 0.0
for length in all_len:
if length <= real_len:
num_false_pos += 1
# calculate
y.append(num_false_pos*100/total_chars)
# set y-axis
axes = plt.gca()
axes.set_ylim([0, 100])
# plot it
plt.plot(columns, y, ’blue’)
# save fig
plt.savefig(out_file)
plt.close()
return
C.2 Time Plot
The function, main(), takes in the timing of the attack data for each iterations, and plot
them on a graph.
def main():
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args = parse_args()
print args
# init vars
in_files = args.files
out_file = args.output
title = args.title
all__times = {}
# read data
for f in in_files:
dictionary = load_file(f)
temp_data = dictionary[DICTKEY_TIME]
for k, v in temp_data.iteritems():
if k not in all__times.keys():
all__times[k] = []
all__times[k].append(int(v))
# print all__times
# calculate average
avg_time = {}
for k, v in all__times.iteritems():
avg_time[k] = sum(v) / len(v)
# print avg_time
# create figure
fig = plt.figure(title)
fig.suptitle(title, fontsize=14,
fontweight=’bold’)
plt.ylabel(’Time (seconds)’)
plt.xlabel(’Number of Rounds’)
# sort it by key and retrieve x, y
avg_time = sorted(avg_time.items(),
key=lambda s: int(s[0]))
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avg_time = remove_first(avg_time)
x, y = zip(*avg_time)
# plot
plt.plot(x, y, ’bo’)
# add labels
ax = fig.add_subplot(111)
for xy in zip(x, y):
ax.annotate(’(%s)’ % xy[1],
xy=xy, textcoords=’data’)
# save fig
plt.savefig(out_file)
plt.close()
return
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Glossary
BEAST Short for Browser Exploit Against SSL/TLS, attack that extracts authentication
token by exploiting vulnerability in chain block chaining mode that TLS 1.0 uses 3
BREACH Short for Browser Reconnaissance and Exfiltration via Adaptive Compression
of Hypertext, compression side-channel attack that exploits against HTTP compres-
sion algorithm 2, 9
CRIME Short for Compression Ratio Info-leak Made Easy, compression side-channel at-
tack that extract secrets from HTTP header 2, 7
DEFLATE Compression algorithm by applying Lempel-Ziv 77 then Huffman coding 1,
7
LZS Lempel-Ziv-Stac, compression algorithm by combining Lempel-Ziv 77 and fixed Huff-
man coding 1
TLS Transport Layer Security, it provides compression and security for the transport layer
of Open Systems Interconnection layers. 1
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